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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
SYLVIA HILL and ANN RASMUSSON, 
Co-Ex.ecutors of the Estate of 
Lila Shand Anderson, deceased, 
and SYLVIA HILL and ANN RASMUSSON 
Individually, ' 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
SAFECO INSURANCE COMP ANY, 
Defendant. 
CAROLYN A. JENSEN, Administratrix 
of the Estate of A. Paul Anderson, 
also known as Archie Paul Anderson, 
deceased, 
Intervenor and Respondent. 
Case 
No. 
11268 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to determine .entitlement, as between 
two .estates, to the proceeds of fire insurance issued to, in 
the name of, and the pr.emiums on which were paid by Re-
spondent's Intestate. The insurer (Safeco Insurance Com-
pany) is not involved in the appeal. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Upon Findings of Fact that the husband (Respondent's 
Intestate) had paid all pr.emiums upon a policy which had 
been issued to him and exclusively in his name; that the 
husband had an insurable interest in the improvements to 
the real property and was the owner of separate personal 
property insured thereby, the Trial Court ruled that the 
husband's estate was entitled to the insurance proceeds. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
R.espondent asks this Court to affirm the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The competing interests are the estates of a husband 
and wife simultaneously killed when their residence burned 
at Salina, Utah. Both had children by former marriages 
and separate heirs. 
The "Home Owners Policy" (Exhibit 3) issued by Safe-
co Insurance Company1 was a renewal of the orginal and 
successor policies, all of which were issued to and in the 
name exclusively of A. Paul Anderson (R. 69 and Exhibit 
3). 
A. Paul Anderson, the Respondent's Intestate, will be 
referred to as "Paul". Appellants' Intestate, Lila Shand 
Anderson, will be referred to as "Lila". 
The first policy of insurance was issued to Paul when 
he and his first wife, Adelia Anderson, mother of Paul's 
heirs, purchased the home in 1957 (R. 69). 
Paul paid all of the premiums required to maintain the 
Home Owners Policy in effect which premiums were paid, 
as agreed in the mortgage, out of a reserve credited from 
a part of the monthly mortgage installments (R. 69 and 
Exhibit 6). The Trial Court found that Paul paid all and 
that Lila paid none of the premiums on the policy (R. 55, 
Finding No. 9) There is no evidence to the contrary. 
The policy (Exhibit 3) provided coverage of $17,000.00 
upon the building and $6,800.00 for personal p r o p e rt Y 
(R. 55). 
The evidenoe is undisputed that the building, prior to 
Paul's marriage to Lila, had a value of $17,000.00 (R. 107) 
and that Paul had separate distinguishable personal prop-
erty in the residence at the time of the loss having a value 
exceeding $7,000.00 (R. 104). The Court made findings to 
this effect (R. 55, Finding No. 13). 
lWhich, having paid the proceeds of the policy into Co u rt and with-
drawn, is not a party to this appeal. 
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It appears customary with Paul that in each of his two 
marriag,es title to the residence was held in the name of the 
wifo. (R. 65, Exhibit 1; R. 71, Exhibit 8). 
Adelia Anderson, Paul's first wife and the mother of 
the heirs in his estate, took record title to the home when it 
was purchased (Exhibit 8). Adelia died February 29, 1964 
(R. 96). Prior to her death she had executed a deed to the 
home running in favor of her three children but this was 
never recorded (Exhibit 24. See also R. 108, 109). 
There was a Warranty Deed from Paul to his second 
wife, Lila, which they did record (Exhibit 1, See R. 65). 
The insuranoe company and the mortgage company 
continued to send notices to Adelia or "Ada Anderson" after 
her death (R. 72, Exhibit 6). Paul continued to pay all the 
mortgage payments (Exhibit 7) and took out each renewal 
policy in his own name (Exhibit 1). 
LHa was a lady of considerabJ,e personal i n h e r i t e d 
worth (R. 104) spending a great deal of money in the home 
(Tr. 87-92) and undoubtedly had substantial personal prop-
erty in the residence at the time of the loss; nevertheless, 
Paul's property was not over-insured prior to any improve-
ments she might have made (R. 106, Findings 12 and 13, 
R. 55). 
Paul was r,esiding in ·the home as of the date of his 
death (R. 81); he was paying taxes thereon (R. 69, Exhibit 
G), lights (R. 79), water and sewer (R. 80), and furnishing 
fuel (R. 81) to the home. 
Telephone bills in substantial amounts wel'e paid by 
Lila (R. 94). 
Lila ldt a Last WiU and Testament which counsel for 
her estate offered into evidence. (Exhibit 9 and R. 73). 
This gav,e to Paul a life estate in the property with the 
condition subsequent that should he remarry his life estate 
Would be extinguished (Exhibit 9, Paragraph 6). 
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Paul was not a party to Lila's will and there is no evi-
dence whether he knew or did not know of its contents. The 
eff.ect of Lila's will would have defeated Paul's children of 
anY in: erest in the home previously owned by thei·r mother 
and paid for by their parents. Had Lila left no will or had 
she left at least as much as is provided by the Utah Laws 
of intestate succession Paul's heirs would have inherited 
some estate in the home (Section 7 4-4-5, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953). 
After the loss the Executrices of the Last Will and 
T.estament of Lila filed suit (R. 1-4) against the insuranoe 
company defendant which answered alleging that an indi-
spensable party, namely the personal representativ.e of 
Paul's estate, was not before the Court (R. 6). Upon inter-
vention of Paul's estate the insurance company paid the 
proceeds of the policy into Court and withdrew (R. 10-13). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRTAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE HUSBAND'S ESTATE WAS ENTITL-
ED TO THE PROCEEDS OF HIS OWN FIRE IN-
SURANCE POLICY. 
A. A POLICY OF FIRE INSURANCE TS A PER-
SON AL CONTRACT WHICH DOES NOT RUN 
WITH THE LAND. 
B. NETTHER THE P 0 L ICY NOR ITS FACE 
VALUE CONSTITUTES "PROCEEDS OF THE 
PROPERTY INSURED" 
C. A STRANGER TO THE POLICY CANNOT IN-
TERFERE WTTH THE TNSURED'S RIGHT TO 
SETTLEMENT WITH HIS INSURER. 
Appellants' expression of the issues in their Statement 
of Points is considerably more argumentative than either 
the brief or the cases they employ. 
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Their thesis - that destruction of substantial property 
owned by the wife entitles her ,estate to participate in in-
surance owned by another indemnifying his own insurable 
interests - seems to be based upon two misconceptions, one 
of fact and one of law. 
First, and as we will discuss hereinafter, the husband 
owned, individually and separately, personal property valued 
in excess of the personal property coverage (R. 104). Sec-
ond, the husband had an insurable interest in the improve-
ments to real property which the law will not seek to evalu-
ate (See Couch on Insurance, 2d Edition, Sec. 24.2 p. 67). 
A. A POLICY OF FIRE INSURANCE IS A PER-
SONAL CONTRACT WHICH DOES NOT RUN 
WITH THE LAND. 
It is universally recognized that a policy of fire insur-
ance is personal property. Appleman on Insurance, Vol. 3A, 
Page 206, S.ection 1861. It is a personal contract (Galante 
vs. Hathaway Bakers, Inc., 176 NYS 2d 87) and runs to the 
insured and not with the land. Richardson vs. Providence 
Washington Insurance Co., 237 NYS 2d 893. 
A fire insurance policy is a personal contract indemni-
fying the insured against loss resulting from the destruc-
tion of or damage to that property. (Russell vs. Williams, 
374 P2d 827, 58 Cal 2d. 487 and the cases therein cited.) 
B. NEITHER THE POLICY NOR ITS FACE VALUE 
CONSTITUTES "PROCEEDS OF THE PROPER-
TY INSURED" 
The sum paid is in no proper or just sense the "pro-
ceeds of the property." Spaulding vs. Miller, 103 Ky. 405, 
45 SW 462, Russell vs. Williams, supra. 
In Russell vs. Williams, supra, 374 P2d at Pag.e 829, 
it is held: 
It is a principle of standing that a policy of fire in-
surance does not insure the property covered there-
by, but is a personal contract indemnifying t~e in-
sur.ed against loss resulting from the destruction of 
or damage to his interest in that property. 
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The facts in that case are remarkably similar to thos,e 
found here: 
There the wife, who survived the husband, was a joint 
tenant with him in property upon which the husband had 
procured a policy of fire insurance. The husband and wife 
separated and the wife obtained a Nevada divorce in which 
no reference was made to property rights of the parties. 
The husband insured the premises which were destroyed 
shortly before his death. The wife became the sole owner 
of the premises (virtually the pl'.ecise facts here) 2 by reason 
of the husband's death and brought suit to recover the in-
surance proceeds. 
The Court observed that "the Plaintiff's claim is based 
on the contention that the moneys paid under the policy 
constituted proceeds of the prop,erty and retains the charac-
ter of that property". This, the Court held, "is a f a 1 s e 
premise". 
After supporting the observations above with numer-
ous cases from many jurisdictions the California Supreme 
Court ruled in logical sequence that: 
(374 P2d at page 830) Unless the insured has an 
obligation to insure, or equitable considerations are 
present, the proceeds of a policy issued to and paid 
for by the named insured on his separate insurable 
interest ar.e not subjecct to the claim of others who 
also have an interest in the property covered by the 
policy. 
* * * 
There is no obligation upon the part of one co-tenant 
to insure the other co-tenant against loss of the lat-
ter's inter,est in their jointly owned property. 
* * * 
As to this matter there is no distinction between the 
2Since this action was tried in the District Court the Executrices of 
Lila's estate have sold and conveyed the land and s a 1 v a g e of the 
building. 
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various types of co-tenancy. Analogously it has been 
held that there is no duty upon a life tenant to in-
sure for the benefit of the remaindermen. 
* * * 
Following the rules her.etofore stated, the right of 
one co-tenant to recover the proceeds of a policy of 
insurance issued to another co-tenant has been de-
ni·ed (citing cas.es) . T h e s a m e ruling has been 
applied as between a life tenant and a I'.emainder-
man. 
The Russell case is clearly identical with the facts here. 
Paul held and maintained a separate, insurable interest in 
the property. He obtained and paid for out of his separate 
funds all the premiums on the policy (R. 55) which was 
issued in his name sol.ely (Exhibit 3). His wife's estate 
through a conveyance (rather t h an by termination of a 
joint tenancy as in the Russell case) emerged with title and 
upon loss seeks to acquire the insuranoe proceeds. 
C. A STRANGER TO THE POLICY CANNOT IN-
TERFERE W I T H THE JNSURED'S RIGHT TO 
SETTLEMENT WITH HIS INSURER. 
The Russell case is clearly identical w i t h the facts 
here. Paul held and maintained a separate, insurable inter-
est in the property. He obtained and paid for out of his 
separate funds all the premiums on the policy (R. 55) which 
was issued in his name solely (Exhibit 3). 
It is most significant that the California S u p r e m e 
Court, although adopting much of the intermediate appel-
latee court's language, saw fit to add the following pro-
nouncements: 
(374 P2d at page 832) Mr. Mouser (Defendant Wil-
liams' intestate) by purchasing with his separate 
funds fire insurance payable to himself alone evi-
denced an intent to protect only his own inteiiest in 
the property and not that his co-tenant should shl:lre 
in any proceeds of the insurance contract to which 
she was not a party and for which she gave no con-
sideration. 
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The terms of this policy were fixed before Lila had any 
connection with or inter.est in the premises affected. (Ex-
hibits 3, 6 and 7). 
An insurer may not, in fact, pay a loss to any one other 
than or except for the insured or his designee. Mercantile 
Credit Corp vs. Downey, 238 NYS2d 630; Ketner Bros. vs. 
Nichols, 324 P2d 1093. 
POINT II 
THE HUSBAND HAD THE ONLY INSURABLE 
INTEREST IN THE INSURED PERSONALTY; 
HAD AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE IN-
SURED IMPROVEMENTS TO R E A LT Y AND 
WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO INSURE FOR THE 
BENEFIT OF HIS SECOND WIFE'S ESTATE. 
A. THE HUSBAND OWNED, SINGLY AND SEP-
ARATELY, PERSONAL PR 0 PERT Y EX-
CEEDING IN VALUE THE PERS 0 N AL 
PROPERTY COVERAGE. 
B. THE HUSBAND HELD AN INSURABLE INT-
EREST IN THE INSURED IMPROVEMENTS 
TO REALTY AND A STRANGER TO THE 
POLICY HAS NO STANDING TO QUESTION 
THE VALUE OF HIS INTEREST. 
C. THERE JS NO DUTY ON A PERSON IN POS-
SESSION TO INSURE THE RIGHTS OF OTH-
ERS IN THE PROPERTY. 
A. THE HUSBAND OWNED, SINGLY AND SEP AR-
ATEL Y, PERSONAL PROPERTY EXCEEDING 
IN VALUE THE PERSONAL PROPERTY COV-
ERAGE. 
The insurance policy afforded coverage of $6,800.00 for 
"unscheduled personal property" (Exhibit 3). Paul had in 
excess of $7,000.00 worth of personal property destroyed 
in the fire (R. 104) and this evidence was uncontradicted 
(R. 55 Findings No. 13) . 
Pa u 1 had an "insurable interest" however, in Lila'~ 
property, real and personal (Annotati<>n 27 ALR2d 1059, see 
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editorial comment at page 1060). For purposes of personal 
property, howev.er, he need assert none because of his separ-
ate, insured property rights. 
B. THE HUSBAND HELD AN INSURABLE INTER-
EST IN THE INSURED IMPROVEMENTS TO 
REALTY AND A STRANGER TO THE POLICY 
HAS NO STANDING TO QUESTION THE 
VALUE OF HIS INTEREST. 
The ALR Annotation (Volume 27 2d at page 1060) ob-
serves: 
Summarizing the decisions, without at this point 
going into detail, it appears that where a spouse has 
some pecuniary or beneficial interest in the other 
spouse's property, or would suffer some disadvan-
tage from its loss, he or she has been held to have 
an insurable interest therein. 
Thes.e decisions apply equally to real property as well 
as personal property (See Page 1064 of the Annotation). 
It is obvious that in this case Paul stood to sustain 
some disadvantage from the loss of the property and that 
he also had both a pecuniary and a beneficial inter.est in the 
"real property of his spouse" as those terms are employed 
in the ALR Annotation. It is to be noted that those condi-
tions are not in th€ conjunctiv,e but are in the disjunctive, 
the rule being that the spouse in order to have an insurable 
interest in the property of his wife or her husband, need 
only hav.e a :pecuniary interest or a beneficial inter.est,~ 
would suffer "some disadvantagefrom its loss". 
In practice, insurance companies request information 
from named insureds, to assist in a determination of wheth-
er or not they had an insurable interest in the property, 
relating to who paid the taxes and mortgage payments 
upon the property, who paid the lights, gas, fuel, water, and 
other utilities, and whether that person maintained any 
residence separate and distinct from the premises destroyed 
by fire. 
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This practice is obviously a consequence of the deci-
sions collected in 27 ALR2d and reflected in the highly im-
portant Utah decision of National Farmers Union vs. 
Thompson, 4 U2d 7, 286 P2d 249, which, in interpeting 
Utah Laws, states this: 
But if he has an inter.est of any character in the 
property so that he will or may derive some pecu-
niary benefit from the continued existence of the 
property or suffer pecuniary loss from its destruc-
tion by fire, he may properly be said to meet the 
statutory requirement of having a "substantial 
economic interest". If this test is met, that suffices, 
and the nature of his interest or the status of his 
title or possession is immaterial. 
In that case the plaintiff had actually sold the property 
to another but retained the use of the building to store his 
machinery. 
How can it be said tl:at Paul Anderson, who had such 
an .equitable interest in the building as to be paying mort-
gage payments, taxes, utilities, and furnishing the fuel 
costs thereto, did not have an insurable interest. He had 
an unqualified right of possession and, by Plaintiffs' own 
evidence, would hav.e had the right to the same for an in-
determinate and indefinite period of time following the 
death of Plaintiffs' intestate. 
Of all the cases we have .examined, the o n l y one in 
which a husband was held not to hav.e an insurable interest 
in his wife's property involved theft of a diamond ring 
(Price vs. United Pacific Casualty Ins. Co., 153 Ore. 259, 56 
P2d 116). It i·s elemental to observe that the husband would 
not likely sustain any disadvantage or any pecuniary loss as 
a result of this theft. The Court in that cas.e, however, was 
careful to point out that an insurable interest of the hus-
band in his wife's personal property must be recognized in 
items such as "household furniture, where the two w,ere in 
possession and enjoyment of the personalty, since he there-
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by derived an advantage from the property and would sus-
tain a loss if it was destroyed or stolen"; but since the hus-
band did not contend that he had any beneficial interest in 
the ring and that it appeared that it was not in his posses-
sion and that its destruction or theft would not terminate 
any advantage which he had enjoyed previously, he had no 
insurable inter.est ther.ein. 
Here, as in many instances, the expression of one ,ex-
ception to the rule of law clearly delineates the field of facts 
and circumstances which are expressly covered by the gen-
eral rule. In Grogan vs. Henderson, 313 SW2d 316, it was 
held that where fire policies on house and furniture belong-
ing to decedent and her husband were personal between the 
husband and insurers, the pr o c e e d s of the policy were 
payable .exclusively to the husband, notwithstanding the 
fact that such property might have been community proper-
ty and notwithstanding the fact that the heirs of the de-
cedent might have had an insurable interest in such prop-
erty. 
In Newsome vs. St. Paul Mercury Fire Insurance Co., 
:)31 SW2d 497, was held: 
The proceeds of a fire policy taken out by a joint 
owner on only his interest inure to his benefit alone 
and where by the terms of the policy the insurer is 
not to be liable beyond the interest of the insured in 
the property, a stranger to the contract cannot col-
lect thereon simply because he was the owner of an 
undivided inter.est in the property. 
In the Washington Supr.eme C o u r t case of Ketner 
Bros., Inc., vs. Nichols, cited hereinabove, it is held: 
It is elementary that a fire insurance policy is a 
pur,ely personal contract, and that payment by the 
insurer to the insured named in the policy is com-
pulsory * * * Considering this fact, the defendants 
had no authority to interfere with the payment of 
the proceeds to the insur,ed much less a duty to do 
so. 
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C. THERE IS NO DUTY ON A PERSON IN POSSES-
SION TO INSURE THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS IN 
THE PROPERTY. 
Probably one of the most definitive cases on this point 
is the Virginia Supreme Court decision of Lynch vs. John-
son, 196 Va. 516, 84 SE2d 419, a 1954 case. In this decision 
the Court stated: 
Hence, it may be said generally, if any person in-
sures his own interest in property in his own right 
and at his own expens,e, then he is entitled to the in-
surance proceeds and the owner of any other inter-
est in that property has no claim to such proceeds; 
and if the insurance so procured exceeds the value of 
the insurable interest, then the excess is of no con-
cern to any other person who also has an inter,est 
in the property but is a question exclusively between 
the insured and the insurer. 
The Lynch case r.ef.ers to the Massachusetts decision of 
Harrison vs. Pepper, 166 Mass. 288, 44 NE223, which de-
fined the rights of co-tenants or persons owning successive 
interests in property to insure their rights, interests, and 
claims, and defining further the rights which one may have 
in the policy or policies of another, in this manner: 
Each can insure his own interest, but in the absence 
of any stipulation or agreement n e i t h ,e r has ai1y 
claim upon the proceeds of the other's policy. 
The Virginia case of Thompson vs. Gearhart, 137 Va. 
427, 119 SE2d 67, states: 
* * * Each of them had an insurable interest in the 
property but a policy in the name of one could not 
cov.er the interest of the other. Th e natur,e and 
effect of an insurance contract is to indemnify the 
insur.ed against loss or damage, and not some one 
else who is not a party to the contract; nor has such 
other party any lawful claim upon the amount rea~­
ized by the insured under the contract; it is the ulll-
versally accepted doctrine that a contract of insu~·­
anc.e is a personal contract and inures to the benefit 
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of the party with whom it is made, and indemnif:es 
h·im against loss, and that the amount paid by the 
C'Oril'pany "is in no proper or just sense the proceeds 
of the policy". 
As expressed in Couch on Insurance, Sec. 24.13, Second 
Edition, Anderson 1960: 
A person has an insurable inter.est in p r o p er t y 
whenever he would profit by or gain some advan-
tage by its continued existence and suffer some loss 
or disadvantage by its destruction. If he would sus-
tain such loss, it is immaterial whether he has, or 
has not, any title in, or lien upon, or possession of, 
the property itself. 
* * * Any interest in property, legal or .equitable, 
qualified, conditional, contingent, or absolute, or 
merely the right to use the property, with or with-
out the payment of rent, is suffident. 
The law does not seek to evaluate the extent of the 
insurable interest. It therefor.e is immaterial that 
the i·nterest of the insured is over-valued as long as 
the actual interest is substantial in relation to the 
amount of the insurance. 
A body of law closely paralleling, if not embracing, 
these facts may be found in those cases where a life-tenant 
in possession of the premises insured for the whole value of 
the fee and remaindermen ask for a division among claim-
ants to the successiv.e estates. These efforts to apportion 
the insurance proceeds are universally denied. (Annotation: 
126 ALR pag.e 336). 
Appellants concede that Paul was at least a life-tenant 
(Pag.e 15 of their brief). The Respondent does not claim 
any mor.e. In fact, since the evidence was submitted in the 
case, Appellants have sold the land and the salvage of the 
improvements. 
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POINT III 
THE "EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS" ALL 
RUN IN FAVOR OF THE HUSBAND'S HEIRS 
AND ESTATE 
Undoubtedly both LHa and Paul at some time prior to 
Lila's will intended that the latter should be entitled at least 
to retain possession of the pr.emises during his lifetime and, 
if Lila predeceased him, to inherit the home from her. Lila, 
by her Last Will and Testament (Exhibit 9, paragraph 6), 
implemented yet frustrated this apparent agreement. In 
any event she left Paul a life estate in the home, the value 
of which the law will not seek to establish (See Point IIB 
hereinabove) . 
If any trust were breached it was by Lila's unilateral 
act of disinheriting Paul's (and his first wif.e, Adelia's) 
children by limiting his interest to a life estate and by fur-
ther making that defeasible by a condition subsequent of 
any marriage he might contract after Lila's death. 
The Russell case, which articulates Respondents's case 
more persuasively than we are capable, discussed "equita-
ble considerations" which may entitle a strang.er to the in-
surance contract to participate in the proceeds. 
First of all, the ratio decidendi establishes that neither 
marriag.e nor co-ownership is a compelling influence to 
avoid the general rule. Nor is the fact that a husband is a 
"tenant at sufferance" of the wife's legal property inter-
ests. 
But this case, in reasoning which the Supr,eme Court 
felt strengthened the decision of the i n f e r i o r appellate 
court, distinguished an older California ruling with thes·e 
observations: (374 P2d at 832). 
It may further be noted that in Estate of MacDonald 
the decedent had by her will demonstrated an int~nt 
that her legatee s h o u l d receive the automobile, 
whereas in the present case decedent Mr. Mouser by 
purchasing with his separate funds fire insurance 
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payable to himself alone evidenced an intent to pro-
tect only his own interest in the property and not 
that his co-tenant should share in any proceeds of 
the insurance contract to which she was not a party 
and for which she gave no consideration. 
Paul and the mother of his heirs had bought and paid 
for [and a portion of the insurance prceeds have already 
been devoted to pay the balance remaining due on the mort-
gage (R. 10-13) affecting] a home which, w h ,en Adelia 
died, was worth at least $17,000.00 (R. 107). 
Paul's good faith and trust evidenced in his conveying 
to his second wife should not now be interpreted to mean 
that Paul's heirs benefit by a windfall in their settlement 
under a fire policy purchased before his second marriage. 
Lila's estate is substantial and Paul's is valueless with-
out the proceeds (R. 103). 
Although Adelia intended to leave the home to her 
children if they survived their father (Exhibit 24 and R. 
108, 109), Paul's subsequent marriage prompted the record-
ing- of a deed to himself (R. 65 and Exhibit 1). 
Ther,e is no showing of any consideration for the sub-
sequent deed to Lila (Exhibit 1) nor her contribution to the 
insurance premiums. 
Can Lila's act in disinheriting Paul and his children 
create an "equitable consideration" compelling payment of 
the insurance proceeds to Lila's heirs because by Lila's act 
she may have legally (but .E.£!_ equitably) defeated his en-
titlement to inherit the home from her or at the minimum 
enjoy a life estate insurable under all the for.egoing rules? 
We respectfully submit not, and urge that the Judg-
ment should be affirmed. 
R,espectfully submitted, 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
By Ken Chamberlain 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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